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This report details a naturalistic study that investigates the effect of communications and sensor 
technologies used by Soldiers in a tactical organization to gain intelligence against an adaptive enemy 
threat.  Communication and sensor technologies were used to simulate current and future force 
capabilities for networked systems. Soldiers comprised an experiment force and simulated two platoons 
of an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) force. Data collection included observational, 
quantitative, and qualitative methods designed to illuminate the contributions that networked information 
make to decision accuracy and timeliness.  We document results to suggest that networked sensing and 
communication technologies enhance tactical decision making; yet these benefits come at the cost of 
basic instincts of Soldier survivability – to remain aware of the immediate environment. Field 
observations and self-report measures of frustration and workload demonstrate this effect.  The metric of 
human trust in networks was useful to the overall analysis; we recommend specific ways in which this 
measure can be modified and improved.  Our conclusions document that future networked battlefield 
operating systems must have redundant communication capabilities to protect against information warfare 
attack.   
Introduction 
The emphasis on investigating the cognitive impact of an integrated C4ISR suite of technologies was 
driven by the understanding that warfare will always be a human activity.  Technology must support 
human decision making, but it will never replace it.  The drive to develop sophisticated decision support 
systems and intuitive visual displays must include consideration for the ways in which Soldiers will 
utilize these systems on the battlefield.  In network enabled operations, information is the essential 
ingredient driving the development requirements for the future network to provide the “quality of firsts”. 
According to United States Army White Paper, Concepts for the Objective Force (2001) the “quality of 
firsts” will provide US forces the ability to “See First, Understand First, Act First, and Finish Decisively” 
which will ensure success on the battlefield.  The qualities of firsts are the expectations of the U.S. Army 
as it combines superior human elements of command with advanced control technology (Conner, 2005).  
This doctrine of network enabled Command and Control (C2) places the Warfighter at the center of a 
complex, dynamic, and uncertain web of information.  This study measured the impact of networked 
human and sensor information on the cognitive performance of Soldiers at the tactical level.  In this 
regard, this study provides a benchmark for future analysis of how valid the basic network centric warfare 
tenets may be for the Future Force at the Company and Platoon echelons. 
 
In his analysis of the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 2003 Thunder Run (where lead elements of the 2nd 
Brigade, 3d Infantry Division attacked Baghdad from the southern outskirts, through the city and west to 
the airport), Conner (2005) noted that carrying the “robust intelligence capability [through a common 
operating picture] forward to the tactical level would prove almost completely lacking” (p.18).  He 
characterized the existence of a ‘digital divide’ between operational and tactical commands, and 
suggested that the reasons for this divide were the great distances covered by tactical units and the vast 
amount of data attempting to be shared.  Conner notes several examples in the early phase of OIF where 
“the promise of technology providing near perfect situational awareness had failed the tactical 
commander” (p. 20).  Conner’s analysis provides the context for the importance of the Cognitive Impact 
Study.  Experience has demonstrated that providing the right information in the right format to the right 
Soldier at the right time is a problem that will require supporting technologies.  However, as these 
engineering and networking solutions are in development, comparable research is needed in the cognitive 
domain to define tactical Warfighter network needs for information sharing, collaboration, and to define 
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limits of perceptual processing.  The Cognitive Impact Study was the first of its kind to examine the 
impact of an integrated network of manned and unmanned systems on the Warfighter operating at the 
center of a networked ISR system of systems. 
To conduct this analysis, 39 Soldiers from the 1/29th Infantry Regiment, Fort Benning, Georgia were 
organized into two reconnaissance platoons and a Company Headquarters element.  Each platoon was 
equipped with mounted and dismounted communications, battle command devices, and a number of 
dismounted Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) collection devices. Additionally, each 
platoon benefitted from higher echelon ISR tools to include Unmanned Ground Sensors (UGS) and 
several Unmanned and Manned Aerial Sensor (UAS) platforms.  These Soldiers operated against a live 
but scripted Opposition Force (OPFOR). 
The platoons were organizationally designed to replicate a legacy and a future force organization.  The 
legacy platoon was named the Spin Out platoon (SO) and the Future Combat System (FCS) platoon was 
the notional future force platoon.  Each platoon had similar communication technologies (both mounted 
and dismounted), but the FCS platoon benefitted from the integration of these technologies into their 
network, while the SO platoon’s technologies were stand-alone applications.  For an example of this 
difference, each platoon had use of a Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV) that provided remote 
visual and imaging capabilities.  In the FCS platoon, these images could be shared with the platoon 
network.  In the SO platoon, the images were only available to the operator, who had to send voice 
messages to his platoon members if he needed to share information from the SUGV.  This would be 




The assignment of communication devices to the platoons was designed to replicate a current force 
equipped with advanced communication support compared to a future force outfitted with a more 
integrated technology system.  An obvious constraint in this effort was that existing and available 
technologies had to be used to surrogate these conditions.   
The SO platoon used a dismounted battle command capability called Warrior Application (Warrior App).  
This technology runs on commercial laptop computers with a display screen that provides SA reports of 
the Blue Force, spot reports of OPFOR, text messaging, collaborative white boarding, and geo-referenced 
satellite imagery.  Warrior App systems were used by the Platoon Leader, Platoon Sergeant, and Squad 
Leaders during all phases of the study.  The Warrior App was integrated with the CERDEC-enhanced 
FBCB21 and allowed leaders to maintain SA while dismounted. The SO platoon also had use of the 
networked Javelin Container Launch Unit (JAV CLU). The JAV CLU allowed Soldiers to network with 
other communication devices to improve their SA through features that provided cooperative sensing and 
engagement capabilities. The JAV CLU also featured a Netted Close Combat Synchronization Tool 
(NCCST).  This allowed Soldiers to receive and transmit imagery from other systems in their platoon, 
such as the identification of targets of interest, reduced time to prosecute target surveillance, and reduced 
time and increased accuracy for magnetic compass calibration via CLU to CLU collaborative calibration. 
One Soldier in the SO platoon operated the SUGV from a stand-alone control unit.  
 
In the FCS platoon, two digital communication devices were provided to support dismounted C2; the 
Black Coral and the Digital Alert Display Device (DADD).  The Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant 
were each assigned a Black Coral dismounted battle command device which allowed them to maintain 
1 The CERDEC has enhanced the fielded FBCB2 system to include features such as chat messaging, sensor imagery 
notifications and availability, and network status displays.   
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situation awareness away from their vehicles. Black Coral was integrated with Command Post of the 
Future (CPoF) server in the Tactical Operations Center (TOC).  It allowed FCS platoon leaders to 
collaborate with CPoF operators at Battalion and Brigade echelons and to share information with their 
local teams.  The DADD was provided to four Scouts.  This is a thin flexible wearable display device 
worn on the forearm and was used for text messaging within the platoon and to the higher echelon. This 
capability is similar to the text messaging feature found on most cell phones.  Soldiers were alerted to 
received-messages through a vibration feature.  Soldiers could compose text messages or could use 
buttons to send messages from a pre-programmed library. Finally, two Soldiers in the FCS platoon were 
equipped with the Army Research Lab – Common Controller (ARL-CC).  This system was used to 
control the SUGVs and provided a dismounted battle command display.  This device also allowed 
Soldiers to receive still and video imagery from image based sensors.    
Computer Network Operations (CNO) Intrusion Attacks 
In addition to the physical challenges presented by the OPFOR, a team from ARL-Survivability Lethality 
Analysis Directorate (SLAD) conducted a series of network intrusion attacks targeting the leadership of 
each platoon to simulate network information warfare.  The variety of attacks covered the full spectrum 
from monitoring the network traffic of the platoon, gaining unauthorized access to systems, to completely 
denying service for a given node (leader), which prevented that node from either sending or receiving 
information.   
 
To conduct its monitoring and attacks, the CNO team monitored and perpetrated their network attacks 
from a vehicle in the FCS network.  (The two platoons used different radio networks in the experiment.) 2 
This allowed the CNO team to move with the FCS platoon and to “see” the entire network.  
Unfortunately, network latency (delay) in traffic passing between the SO to the FCS network was so high 
that many attacks targeting the SO platoon took too long to be effective in the dynamic live environment.  
Thus, the CNO attackers chose to focus primarily on the FCS platoon.  For example, a single ping from 
the CNO team to the SO network sometimes took more than 15 seconds for a return response.  Generally, 
responses less than 2 seconds and are needed to allow for successful network intrusion operations to 
occur. When delays of more than 2 seconds were experienced, the CNO team was forced to focus on 
fewer nodes; thus reducing the effectiveness of the attacks.      
During the course of the trial runs it became apparent that the more difficult-to-detect network attack was 
the intermittent denial of service attack. The Soldiers were provided with some rudimentary tools for 
monitoring network connectivity. The network naturally experienced periods of limited connectivity due 
to terrain, distances between nodes, and mechanical failure.  Thus, it was never clear to the Soldiers when 
the ARL-SLAD team was denying them service or if the network was really performing poorly.  A more 
easily detected attack occurred when the ARL-SLAD team attempted to insert deceptive information into 
the network in the form of annotated images, bogus spot reports or misleading instructions.  It is likely 
that these attacks were quickly identified by the Soldiers because of the small numbers of Soldiers 
targeted who had access to the C2 devices.  Normally the suspicion of an attack was discussed via voice 
between the two “victims” and confirmed that there was indeed an intruder on the net. Once a tool was 
compromised the Soldiers stopped using it. 
Cognitive Measures 
This study captured observational, subjective, and objective data to measure Soldiers’ use of technologies 
to obtain, share, and make sense of complex information about an adaptive enemy force.  Measures of 
cognitive performance included workload, situational awareness (SA), and trust in the network.  In 
addition to these measures, we captured direct feedback from the Soldiers as they described their 
2 The FCS Platoon used the Soldier Radio Waveform (SRW) and the SO Platoon used the Enhanced Position 
Locating Reporting System (EPLRS) radio network.   
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performance and use of the technologies after each mission.  These comments were compiled every day 
into a database that was shared with analysts and technology developers to understand survey results or to 
refine features of technologies. 
Workload 
Workload is generally defined as the perception of imposed task demands on an operator (Hart, 1986, 
1988; Hart & Wickens, 1990).  Perceived workload is influenced by the difficulty, number of tasks, and 
complexity of demands in combination with the required level of performance (e.g. the mental and 
physical effort).  These factors, in turn, drive the level of information processing required for a set of 
tasks (Hoon, Kim, Lee, & Hyun, 2006).  Information processing is influenced by the environment and the 
set of technologies used in the completion of tasks. In the networked Future Force, Soldiers will receive 
information from devices that stimulate visual and auditory senses and require attention to display 
devices. 
Subjective workload was measured using two instruments; the NASA Task Load Index (TLX) and the 
Mission Awareness Rating Scale (MARS). The NASA TLX captures six features of workload: mental 
and physical workload, temporal demand (time pressure felt), satisfaction with own performance, effort, 
and frustration felt (Hart & Staveland, 1988).  These questions were measured on a 100 point scale.  The 
MARS was used to measure the mental workload required to achieve SA (Matthews & Beal, 2002).  
These questions were scored on a four point scale (1 – very easy to 4 – very difficult). Participants 
completed each survey at the conclusion of each mission. 
Situational Awareness 
Situational Awareness was measured based on verbal and text reports provided by a platoon to the higher 
echelon commander.  Generally, these reports followed the SALUTE format (Size, Activity, Location, 
Uniform, Time, and Equipment).  In some cases, a SITREP (situational report) was provided to expound 
on an earlier SALUTE report or to report new enemy activity.  These reports were scored for accuracy in 
two ways; the OPFOR leader provided a high, medium, or low score for each report after the mission and 
the reports were reviewed on the Google Earth Command and Control (C2) Operations (GEC2O) display 
with BLUEFOR and OPFOR position reports visible3.  Additionally, subjective SA measures were used 
with four questions on the MARS instrument (Matthews & Beal, 2002).  These questions captured 
subjective reports of perceived ability to identify, understand, and predict cues in the environment and to 
achieve mission goals.  These were measured on a 1-4 scale (1 = very easy, 4 = very difficult).   
Trust in Network 
The Soldiers in both platoons were asked to report their impressions of how well the network performed 
at the end of each mission according to several factors.  These included their ability to access services 
provided by the network, their ability to communicate over the network, the overall dependability of the 
network, and their trust of the network. These questions were scored on a 7-point scale (1 = low and 7 = 
high).   
The Trust in Network investigation was exploratory and was intended to gain empirical evidence to 
document the process by which Soldiers conduct ISR operations with a tactical network.  Our analysis 
was a useful first step and we discovered several findings that will guide future research. 
3 GEC2O was developed by Mechdyne, Future Skys and JB Management in close coordination with the US Army 





Accuracy and timeliness of PIR completion was measured objectively using the GEC2O technology.  
Analysts reviewed missions from three days and were able to view BLUEFOR and OPFOR position 
reports on the high-resolution terrain imagery.  The tactical message browser and mission timeline tool 
were open on the display such that messages and spot reports appeared on the screen when they were 
received.  The messages that included time of report within the message format were used to measure 
latency between that time and the time the message was received by the network.  In a complementary 
analysis, the NCO leading the OPFOR scored each SALUTE report on a high, medium, or low scale 
based on his knowledge of OPFOR ground truth. 4 
Results  
The organization of the results section will proceed in the following manner.  First, demographics of 
participants will be reported, followed by a brief description of technologies in use and then reports from 
Soldiers on the utility of these.  Next, results from the decision accuracy and timeliness analysis will be 
presented.  Finally, data from the supporting measures of workload, situational awareness, and trust in 
network will be  provided.   
Demographics 
39 Soldiers participated in this experiment.  The rank of participants was almost evenly divided between 
lower enlisted and NCO ranks. In the SO platoon, an equal percent (48%) were E4 and below or NCO 
(E5-E7) and one participant was an Officer.  In the FCS platoon, 56% of participants were E4 or below, 
39% were NCO, and one person was a Senior NCO.  The platoons varied very little by years of 
experience in the Army.  67% of the SO platoon reported less than 5 years of Army experience and 33% 
reported 5-10 years of such experience.  In the FCS platoon, 61% had less than 5 years of experience, 
28% had 5-10 years, and .5% had 11-16 and over 16 years of experience.  Soldiers were also asked to 
report their familiarity with computer games and unmanned systems.  These questions were scored on a 
3-point scale (1=not at all, 2=somewhat, 3=very familiar).  In the SO platoon, 4% reported no familiarity 
at all with computer games, while 67% said they were ‘somewhat familiar’ and 29% said they were ‘very 
familiar’.  In the FCS platoon, 56% said they were ‘somewhat familiar’ and 44% said they were ‘very 
familiar’.  With respect to familiarity with unmanned systems, 52% of the SO platoon said they were ‘not 
at all’ familiar, 43% said they were ‘somewhat familiar’ and 1 soldier (5%) said he was ‘very familiar’ 
with unmanned systems.  This contrasted to the FCS platoon where 28% reported they were ‘not at all’ 
familiar and 72% said they were ‘somewhat familiar’.  The most notable differences between the platoons 
were that the SO platoon was generally younger with less experience, they had fewer group members who 
reported being very familiar with computer games, and they had a larger number of respondents who 
reported being ‘not at all’ familiar with unmanned systems.  The FCS platoon, by contrast, had a few 
members with more than 10 years of Army experience, had a higher percentage of members who were 
‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ familiar with computer games, and a higher percentage of members who reported 
being ‘somewhat’ familiar with unmanned systems.   
Soldier Feedback on Communication Technology 
Analysis of the Soldier comments of all technologies in use illustrated the emergent nature of most of 
these systems; notably the high levels of reported frustration that will be discussed in the workload result 
section.  However, it did appear clear that the dismounted technology provided to each platoon did not 
4 This NCO is, coincidentally, an Intelligence Analyst and was very familiar with essential reporting elements of 
ISR reports.  He provided needed subject matter expertise on determining whether a report was high, medium, or 
low in details that would support PIR completion. 
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perform equally well; in fact, the FCS platoon appeared to be at a disadvantage with the DADD.  It is 
noted that each platoon did have radio communications within their organization, but each platoon was 
equal in that regard.  Table 1 provides a sampling of both positive and negative comments from the FCS 








































Decision accuracy was measured with two complimentary methods; GEC2O screen shots and OPFOR 
NCO analysis.  The GEC2O play-back mechanism was used to examine screen shots that allowed 
comparison of reported grid locations, enemy activity, number of enemy, and reports of high value targets 
to displayed icons. The GEC2O screen shots provided three types of icons that were of interest to this 
analysis.  Two BLUEFOR circle icons are used to denote vehicles and dismounts and red circle icons 
denote OPFOR individuals. These icons, the message window, and the timeline feature are displayed in 
Figure 1.  In addition to analysis of GEC2O screen shots, the FCS and SO platoon SALUTE reports were 
scored by the OPFOR NCO who had first-hand knowledge of OPFOR ground truth.  These were scored 
on a scale of low, medium, or high soon after each mission.  The discussion and screen shots that follow 
illustrate that the combination of human intelligence (HUMINT) and sensor images from ground and 
airborne assets allowed both platoons to have an accurate picture of OPFOR location, size, and activity.   
 
Figure 1: Example of GEC2O Display 
 
Figures 2 and 3 show examples of the level of detail provided by the systems.  The UAV image captured 
by the ROVER 4 remote video terminal user shows three enemy vehicles and is annotated by the user to 




Figure 2: Image sent by the ROVER 4 user to FBCB2 
 
The second example of report accuracy is shown in Figure 3 below.  The FCS platoon leader sent a 
message, after receiving HUMINT and sensor reports of OPFOR activity.  The OPFOR reported grid 
location was entered into the GEC2O system and the yellow “push pin” icon shows the center of that 





Figure 3: Grid location identified by yellow push pin and MGRS coordinates 
 
However, the latency in message receipt had a serious impact on platoon survivability, as shown in the 
next image.   In Figure 4, the SO Platoon sent a message to the FCS Platoon that the enemy force had 
escaped their location at Vietnam Village, approximately 2 miles to the south of the FCS platoon location.  
By the time this message was received, the OPFOR vehicles were in close proximity of the FCS platoon.  




Figure 4: Report from SO Platoon alerts FCS Platoon 
Decision Timeliness 
The decision timeliness analysis focused on missions executed on July 24, 28, and 29.  These missions 
were the most complete in terms of data collected.  Day and night missions were conducted on each of 
these days.  Message latency was recorded in minutes and seconds and converted to seconds for analysis.  
On average, the written reports that were submitted by both platoons had significant latency.  The 
missions occurring in the day had slightly shorter latency, but this was not a significant difference as 
measured by a one way analysis of variance (ANOVA).  Also, the difference in message latency between 
the three days was not significant.  Table 2 below shows the statistics for these reports.  On average, the 
latency for messages was 370.79 seconds, or 6 minutes and 11 seconds.  This latency resulted from delays 
that occurred with the human operators and the network transport layer.  Observations consistently 
documented that the time noted in the SALUTE report was, at a minimum, two minutes earlier than the 
time the message was sent.  Each platoon used a radio or a dismounted communications device to report 
enemy activity to the Platoon Sergeant, located at the vehicle rally point.  The Platoon Sergeant then 
fused this information and formatted the SALUTE report.  Once the report was sent, it traveled through 



































Table 2: Message Latency 
 
Workload 
NASA TLX was used to identify platoon members’ relative perceptions of workload across six workload 
components.  As previously described, two platoons (SO and FCS), each equipped with their unique set 
of sensor and communications equipment, conducted tactical missions against a scripted OPFOR.   
Within the platoons, Soldiers experienced different task demands based on their  position and use of a 
sensor technology.  Every Soldier had access to a basic radio platform, weapon, and was expected to 
operate in accordance with the assigned mission.  In addition, some Soldiers operated sensor technologies 
that required transportation, set up, use, and break-down.  The leaders operated a communications device 
in addition to the radio, and also had to fulfill their leadership duties.  The workload analysis focused on 
two questions; did the platoons differ with respect to workload domains and did Soldiers report a range of 
workload scores? 
Repeated measures Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) was used to analyze the workload 
survey data to answer the first question.  This survey measured six factors of workload on a 100 point 
scale.  These six factors are mental and physical workload, temporal demand, satisfaction with own 
performance, effort, and frustration.  Each participant was assigned to either the SO or FCS platoon for 
the duration of the experiment. The subject pool for this analysis was 36 (19 in SO and 17 in FCS).  The 
analysis included one within factor (day), two between factors (platoon [SO or FCS] and leader [yes or 
no], three two-way interactions (platoon*day, platoon*leader, and leader*day), and one three-way 
interaction of platoon*leader*day.   
 
Of these main and interaction effects, only the main effect of platoon was significant (Wilk’s λ F (6,27) = 
3.71, p =.008).  To determine which dimension of the workload construct contributed to this difference 
between platoons, the between-subjects effects were examined.  Only one subscale dimension, 
‘satisfaction with own performance’, was significant [F=17.54 (1,32) p<.005].  This was a significant 
difference because the SO platoon, on average, had a mean score on ‘satisfaction with own performance’ 
of 74.43 compared to a mean of 53.04 for the FCS platoon.  The chart in Figure 5 shows that the SO 
platoon had higher average scores for leaders and non-leaders than the FCS platoon. 
  10
 
Figure 5: Average Self-Reported Performance 
 
Though this analysis determined that the only source of difference between the platoons fell in the 
subjective perception of performance, both platoons had high scores on all components of the workload 
scale.  The NASA TLX has no established “red line” above which workload scores are dangerously high 
(Hill, 2008).  The TLX is most often used as a measure of relative workload, comparing one group to 
another given the same or similar environments.   
 
Table 3 displays overall means for workload for each of the dimensions.  These means show leader and 
non-leader mean scores.  On average, these scores suggest the following general conclusions: 
 Leaders had higher mental workload than non-leaders 
 Non-leaders had higher physical workload than leaders 
 Leaders had higher temporal (time pressure) workload than non-leaders 
 Leaders had higher satisfaction with own performance than non-leaders 
 Leaders had higher effort scores (mental and physical) than non-leaders 
 Frustration scores were nearly identical for both groups (56.79 compared to 57.2) 
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Estimates
43.461 3.871 35.575 51.347
52.206 6.743 38.472 65.940
46.902 3.864 39.032 54.773
43.819 6.730 30.110 57.527
47.636 3.838 39.819 55.453
52.419 6.684 38.804 66.033
58.356 2.542 53.178 63.534
69.113 4.427 60.094 78.131
56.686 3.421 49.719 63.654
58.931 5.957 46.796 71.066
56.789 4.203 48.227 65.351





















Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound
95% Confidence Interval
 
Table 3: Average Workload 
 
The measurement of workload was important in the Cognitive Impact Study due to the impact of multi-
modal tasks on Soldier performance.  An inverse relationship is expected to exist between workload and 
situational awareness; workload that is exceedingly high is expected to negatively impact the ability to 
develop and maintain SA.  For this reason, we were interested in having a measure of workload that was 
directly related to SA.   
 
The Mission Awareness Rating Scale (MARS) (Matthews & Beal, 2002) was used to provide a measure 
of Soldier perceptions of mental workload associated with the acquisition of SA. The questions are scored 
on a four point scale (1 – very easy to 4 – very difficult).  As the MARS results are reviewed, the reader is 
cautioned that lower scores correspond to ease of understanding or lower mental workload.  Repeated 
measures MANOVA was used to investigate if differences existed between the two platoons with respect 
to responses on the workload subscale (questions 5-8) of the MARS.  These questions probe the level of 
mental workload required to identify, understand, predict, and achieve mission goals.  No significant 
differences were found for either the main effect of platoon (Wilk’s λ F (4,18)  = .99, p =.44) or the main 
effect of day (Wilk’s λ F (8, 14) = .43, p =.88) or the interaction effect of platoon * day (Wilk’s λ F (8, 
14) = 1.8, p =.15). 
 
However, consistent with the finding presented earlier that the SO platoon generally reported higher 
satisfaction with their performance; the SO platoon, on average, reported having low mental workload 
than the FCS platoon.  .  An example of this is provided in Figure 6.  Figure 6 shows that for three of four 
days, the SO platoon, on average, reported lower scores for question 4 “How difficult –in terms of mental 
effort—was it to decide on how to best achieve mission goals during this mission?”    However, the FCS 
platoon had nearly identical mental effort scores for each day, and these scores were higher than any of 
the SO platoon scores.  This suggests that the FCS platoon, on average, reported that they had to work 
harder in terms of mental effort to achieve mission goals.  The days included in this analysis are July 24, 
























Estimated Marginal Means of Achieve
 
Figure 6: Reported Levels of Performance 
 
The MARS data also was used to contrast subjective SA and mental workload between day and night 
conditions.  Paired sample t-tests were used to examine the relationships between day and night 
conditions on subjective SA and mental workload scores for three days: July 24, 28, and 29.  Missing and 
incomplete data prevented additional analysis for the remaining days of the experiment.   The results for 
July 28 showed the only significant difference between day and night responses to subjective SA and 
mental workload (t (18) = 3.43 (two tailed), p=.003), SD-.5).  On average, members of both platoons 
indicated that they were able to understand cues more easily in the night condition than in the day 
condition (M [day] = 2.22, SD = .81, [night] = 1.72, SD = .75).  ).   This led analysts to further examine 
the data to determine what conditions made the night of the 28th easier.  The GEC2O data provided clues 
to this question.  The next two screen shots show the locations of the Blue and Red forces in the MOUT 
facility and the number of sensor reports received at this point in the mission.  The first screen shot, 
displayed in Figure 7, shows a GEC2O image that had been annotated to show OPFOR dismounts.  
Figure 8 shows that the BLUEFOR had a forward presence in the MOUT environment to observe 
OPFOR activity.  This combination of HUMINT and excellent quality of sensor images was most likely 
the explanation for the relatively low ease of understanding scores on the MARS during this mission. 
 
      
Figure 7: Screen shot of July 28 Mission               Figure 8: Screen shot of July 28 Mission 
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 Situational Awareness 
High levels of workload frequently result in lower situational awareness (SA) because of the inability to 
process and share information (Hoon et al., 2006) due inadequate or immature technologies, and poor 
human systems integration.  The bar charts in Figures 9-10 display objective ratings of each platoon’s 
ability to report on PIR during missions.  The PIR reports were scored by the OPFOR NCO leader on a 1-
3 scale (1 = low, 3 = high). Each group of shaded bars in each graph differentiates each day’s reports (e.g. 
the first four bars in the FCS Platoon chart were recorded on the first day).  Different numbers of reports 
were provided by the platoons for each day, depending upon the requirements of the mission and their 
ability to detect enemy activity.   
Visual inspection of the graphs in Figures 9 and 10 shows that the FCS platoon had better overall 
performance in completing PIRs than the SO platoon; though this difference is small and not statistically 
significant.  This is an interesting finding given the higher average perception of own performance on the 
part of the SO platoon. 
 
The FCS platoon completed a total of 37 SALUTE reports over the course of all missions, compared to 
35 reports from the SO platoon.  If the medium and high scores are combined for each platoon, the FCS 
platoon had 92% of their reports in the medium-high range compared to 88.5% for SO platoon.  This 
































































































































Spin Out Platoon Average Situational Awareness
 
Figure 9: FCS Platoon Daily Situation Awareness             Figure 10: SO Platoon Average Situation Awareness 
Trust in Network 
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The Soldiers in both platoons were asked to report their impressions of how well the network performed 
at the end of each mission according to several dimensions.  These included their ability to access services 
provided by the network; communicate over the network; overall dependability of the network; and trust 
in the network.  These questions were scored on a 7-point scale (1 = low and 7 = high).  A repeated 
measures MANOVA was used to explore differences in network trust ratings between each platoon over 
four days of measures.  A significant difference emerged in the between subject effects for each of the 
four categories: access, communicate, depend, and trust.  The statistics for these are shown in the table 
below and indicate that the differences were more noticeable in the aspects of communicate (Wilk’s λ F 
(1,13) = 6.48, p =.024), depend (Wilk’s λ F (1,13) = 9.67, p =.008) and trust (Wilk’s λ F (1,13) = 7.59, p 
=.016).  The factor of access was nearly significant at (Wilk’s λ F (1,13) = 4.60, p =.051).  The graphs in 
Figures 11-14 provide a visual representation of these data.  The mean scores for trust in the network are 
presented in Table 4, and show, on average, higher scores for the SO platoon compared to the FCS 
platoon.   
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Transformed Variable: Average
440.183 1 440.183 38.213 .000
1072.913 1 1072.913 139.218 .000
397.964 1 397.964 77.951 .000
432.055 1 432.055 74.844 .000
52.983 1 52.983 4.600 .051
49.912 1 49.912 6.476 .024
49.364 1 49.364 9.669 .008
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Figure 13: Average Network Dependability                             Figure 14: Average Trust in Network 
 
Discussion 
The Soldiers operating in this experiment were trained in both classroom and field settings.  In the 
classroom, they were introduced to the technologies and learned about all relevant features they would be 
expected to use.  This training was followed by static field training with technology developers where the 
Soldiers had the ability to interact with the systems with expert help nearby.  The platoons then had 
several days of pilot testing where they became more familiar with their technologies in the context of 
mission formations they would be expected to execute in the experiment.  This pilot testing allowed both 
Soldiers and engineers to identify and resolve deficiencies in either training or system performance.  By 
the time the experiment began, 8 days of classroom, static, and mobile field trials had been performed.  
This experiment was somewhat unique in the amount of training that was made available to the Soldiers.  
Additionally, many of these Soldiers had participated in C4ISR OTM E07, and were generally familiar 
with operating integrated technology suites for ISR missions. 
 
The Soldiers who participated in this experiment were all male with an average age of 24 and were almost 
evenly divided between lower enlisted (E1-E4) and NCOs (E5-E7).  Ninety-six percent of the SO platoon 
and 100% of the FCS platoon reported that they were ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ familiar’ with computer 
games.  Researchers were interested in this statistic to determine if this familiarity would help the Soldiers 
in their use of unmanned systems during the experiment.  Conversely, 95% of the SO platoon and 100% 
of the FCS platoon reported that they were ‘not at all’ or ‘somewhat’ familiar with unmanned systems.  
The one question that arises (but is not answered by any empirical or observational data) is whether or not 
the SO platoon may have adapted to challenges they experienced during the missions more positively 
than the FCS platoon due to their relative lack of Army experience.  In other words, this platoon may 
have been less bound by doctrine or training and may have been more open to new ideas with respect to 
using unmanned systems and new communication devices.  This subject should be precisely explored in 
future exercises. 
 
The survey results suggest that the ability to communicate within and between echelons may play a 
central role in general performance indicators.  The SO platoon reported that their communications device 
for intra-squad text communication worked well, compared to the FCS platoon’s technology.  Though SO 
platoon members did not out-perform the FCS platoon in objective measures of decision timeliness or 
accuracy, the SO platoon consistently, and to a significant difference, rated their performance higher than 
did the members of the FCS platoon.  Members of the SO platoon also measured their trust in the network 




The exploratory Trust in Network analysis aided our understanding of how Soldiers conceptualize a 
tactical network and the various technologies that are supported by the network.  The fact that the FCS 
platoon was targeted by information attacks to a greater extent than the SO platoon is a probable 
explanation for the lower trust scores from that platoon.  Additionally, the poor performance of the 
dismounted communication device used by the FCS platoon could have contributed to the low trust 
scores.  However, it is laudable that the FCS platoon overcame these hindrances to attain a high level of 
accuracy in their PIR. With this experience, we can recommend a full range of future research to 
understand the nature of the relationship between network performance, user trust in the network, and 
communication behaviors. 
 
The fact that the Soldiers stopped using a communications technology when they believed they were 
under cyber attack is useful for developing future TTPs in networked operations.  In this system of 
systems configuration, alternate communication devices existed.  Thus, when a Soldier in the FCS 
platoon stopped using a technology because of a perceived system failure due to cyber attacks, they 
continued developing their SA picture of enemy activity by listening to radio communications.  This 
prevented them from being completely isolated from their platoon during mission execution.  Redundancy 
of communication methods is clearly an enabler of information dominance in a network that is open to 
attack and organic node loss.  However, embedded data collectors noted that when Soldiers stopped using 
their technologies, the completeness and timeliness of their situation reports and processes for information 
dissemination within the platoon were slightly degraded.  This was largely due to the time required to 
reboot a technology and to mentally reinsert themselves into the mission.     
 
The communication behaviors required of the Soldiers in this experiment were demanding due to the 
multi-modal nature of the devices.  Soldiers were asked to tactically position themselves using their 
technologies to gain SA of enemy activity.  In some instances Soldiers were able to establish both visual 
contact with the enemy through their own eyes and through a remote video terminal or sensor.  They 
communicated using a radio system within their platoon.  They had dismounted devices that allowed 
them to enter text information or to observe icons and reports on a display.  Some Soldiers were asked to 
operate the SUGV in a tele-operation mode.  In addition to these tasks, they had to execute dismounted 
maneuvers through dense pine forests in extreme heat.  In the case of the night missions, they were 
expected to do all of this with night vision goggles.  In this context, the measurement of workload was of 
central concern.   
 
In spite of the Soldiers’ ability to use the technology suite to develop highly accurate reports, information 
sharing had an unacceptable latency rate of more than 6 minutes.  This latency was caused by several 
factors.  First, the Soldiers had to fuse data from several different sources (e.g. sensor or human) and 
several types (e.g. image, text, streaming video). Second, the Soldiers experienced periodic machine 
malfunctions, which impacted their ability to compose messages and transmit these over the network.  If 
devices were working, visual data (image and video) had to be transformed into textual information.  
Alternately, if a dismounted communications device was not working, the Soldiers reported information 
to a Soldier operating an FBCB2 display in a vehicle.  This Soldier collated information from several 
dismounted squads, and waited until he had enough information to send forward.  Finally, the speed of 
message transfer was dependent on the network.  
 
The environment, technologies, and mission requirements all contributed to the high levels of workload 
experienced by both platoons.  The variety of technologies used in the experiment, with various levels of 
success, contributed to high levels of frustration.  Given the nature of workload, high frustration levels 
would be expected to contribute to a lack of information processing resources needed for task completion.  
The Warrior Application used by the SO platoon, though not without problems, did function sufficiently 
well for the platoon leaders to share information throughout most of the missions.  Conversely, the 
DADD, used by the FCS Platoon squad leaders and scouts, did not enable communication within the 
  18
dismounted sections.  This was identified as a possible explanation for the difference between the two 
platoons in their assessment of performance. 
 
Frustration, a component of the subjective workload assessment, was consistently high throughout the 
experiment and appeared to have two sources; only one of which was anticipated.  The frustration 
associated with malfunctioning technologies was expected and is a given condition in a world where 
technology solutions abound.  The source of frustration that was unexpected was the unwillingness of 
leaders to allow technology users to modify tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in order to 
position their system to gain information collection advantages from a network perspective.  Like the 
child who has to program the digital TV for his/her digital alien parents, the future Robotics NCOs may 
have to advise leaders of technology requirements in relation to the network.   
 
The workload results also demonstrated the protective factor within squads and platoons that results from 
the ability to communicate and share information.  And, while Soldiers advocate for small devices that do 
not significantly add to their already heavy dismounted load, the tablet personal computers in this 
example were more useful than the wrist-worn devices.  In this case, the added physical workload may 
have been mediated by the improvement in performance and low mental effort scores.  
 
Apart from the latency issue and relatively high workload, the ability to share sensor data between vehicle 
and dismounted positions greatly contributed to both platoon’s ability to develop situational awareness.  
The mix of HUMINT text messages and spot reports, sensor images and spot reports, and the BLUEFOR 
position reports provided by these technologies contributed to high levels of situational awareness.  We 
noted earlier the finding that both platoons found it was easier to identify cues during night missions than 
in the day.  This is consistent with the “we own the night” philosophy of technology-aided visualization 
and with the difference between urban and forested terrain.  This finding was also present in the urban 
terrain where landmarks were easier to differentiate compared to forested and sandy terrain. 
Conclusion 
This analysis illustrates the balance that must be achieved between the art of Command and the science of 
Control for the future of tactical networks. The results of this cognitive impact study show conclusively 
that the ability of Soldiers to Soldiers’ use of technology to view enemy activity from air and ground 
perspectives and to communicate this information within and between units contributes greatly to their 
situational awareness.  However, the process of extracting this information and transforming it to text 
messages that must be transmitted over a network cause unacceptable delays that must be addressed in 
future organizational and network configurations.   
 
We believe workload to be a critical component in understanding the cognitive impact of an integrated 
C4ISR network.  Subjective workload can provide insight into the nature of the tasks assigned to 
individuals and teams of Soldiers.  It can also guide the development of adaptive automation to reduce 
Soldiers’ workload.  Understanding how various tasks contribute to high levels of workload can lead to 
the design of smart displays that reduce certain types of workload factors, such as time demands, mental 
fatigue, and frustration.  Alternately, knowledge of Soldier strategies to reduce high levels of workload 
can lead to better human systems integration with various technologies to reduce workload burden.  
Finally, understanding subjective workload levels will determine the type and amount of technical support 
required by Soldiers.   
 
Frustration with the use and performance of the provided technologies was a major feature of networked 
operations for the participants in this study.  In a battlefield environment that is inherently complex and 
uncertain, additional sources of frustration are counterproductive.  The presence of Robotics NCOs who 




It should not be surprising that a suite of technologies increased the frustration and workload levels of the 
soldiers who operated these systems.  Given the known association between high levels of workload and 
decreased situational awareness, this is a major focus area for technology developers and human factors 
specialists.  Clearly, these integrated systems must be refined significantly prior to actual fielding.   
 
For all of the aforementioned detractors of the integrated technology suite, it did represent the major 
factor in decision accuracy, albeit as the cost of timeliness.  Accuracy of decision making was made 
possible by mixed asset sensor data (provided by human intelligence, air and ground sensors, and 
unattended ground sensors), the FBCB2 displays that depicted BLUEFOR positions of dismounts and 
vehicles and recorded messages and spot reports, common operating display, and the communications 
within the platoons (via radio and technology devices).  The Soldiers in both platoons used their 
respective technology assets to the best of their ability and were successful to the limits of the technology 
performance (note the mixed performance of the dismounted communication technologies used by each 
platoon).  Further, the FCS platoon demonstrated adaptation and innovation with their response to 
information attacks.     
 
In spite of the ability of the technology suite to provide data to Soldiers, the information shared by the 
platoons had an unacceptable latency rate of over 6 minutes. This latency was caused by several factors.  
First, the Soldiers had to fuse data from several different sources (e.g. sensor or human) and several types 
(e.g. image, text, streaming video). Second, the Soldiers experienced periodic machine malfunctions, 
which impacted their ability to transmit. If devices were working, these transmissions had to be entered 
into a communications device that required typing information into a display. If a dismounted 
communications device was not working, the Soldiers reported information to a Soldier operating an 
FBCB2 display in a vehicle.  This Soldier collated information from several dismounted squads, and 
waited until he had enough information to send forward.  Finally, the message had to transit the network.  
 
The good news from the Cognitive Impact Study was the high rate of PIR accuracy achieved by both 
platoons using an integrated sensor suite with redundant capabilities.  The bad news was that this 
accuracy came at the cost of unacceptable time delays.  At the tactical level of warfighting, information is 
perishable and must be shared in seconds rather than minutes.  While radio communications provided 
near-real time information sharing in this network, alternate means of sharing data are required for 
MANETs in order to moderate bandwidth requirements.  The accuracy attained by the FCS and SO 
platoons was supported in large part by the sensor imagery and text communications. Future iterations of 
tactical networks must allow the transfer of information with significantly reduced latency.     
 
This analysis clearly documents the cognitive impact of an integrated technology suite on a tactical force 
conducting ISR activities against a thinking and adaptive enemy force.  Technology assets contribute the 
element of accuracy to Soldiers while costing them the needed advantage of timeliness.  The technology 
suite demonstrated in this study provides an effective roadmap for the future force.  Technology 
capabilities have demonstrated positive impacts on Soldier situational awareness and decision making.  
The challenge remaining is to enable transfer of information in milliseconds rather than minutes.  The 
requirements of the tactical force for information sharing are unique and will not be met by a ‘one size fits 
all’ network.  Future research and development must focus on defining specific information sharing and 
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